In this work we use data on response times from a public good experiment to test the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, under the assumption that the longer the time of the decision, the less instinctive the choice. Results seem to support the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive, while defection is 'rational'. Moreover, as the experiment is designed also to assess the effects of the consumption of relational goods on cooperation, we are also able to state that some types of relational goods, like team working, produce additional cooperation, but make it less spontaneous. We also detect that males seem to behave more instinctively than females.
Introduction
Economic experiments often produce interesting by-product data; among these the time taken by each subject to decide his move, that might shed some light on the emotions which govern individual decision processes. Indeed, surveying a series of games often used in the experimental literature, Rubinstein (2007) finds a direct correspondence between the player's time to make her/his choice and her/his emotions: his survey suggests "that choices made instinctively, that is, on the basis of an emotional response, require less response time than choices that require the use of cognitive reasoning" (p.1243). In a public and private goods experiment, Brown et al. (2008) test the consistency between subjects' preferences and choices; they observe that consistent choices take less time than inconsistent ones. Eventually, in a modified dictator game, Piovesan and Wengström (2009) find that "faster subjects make egoistic choices more often than slower subjects in a nonstrategic setting " (p.196) . The above findings suggest that in a non-strategic setting the instinctive choice is selfish, which is consistent with the behaviour of homo oeconomicus, as traditionally predicted by the classic economic literature.
In other cases, where retaliation is possible and strategic thinking is therefore involved, it has been shown that non-cooperative behaviours are punished more between friends than between strangers (Reuben and van Winden, 2008) . In such context cooperation might be the choice that maximises the subject's payoff, as avoiding retaliations could be optimal. Hence it is possible that in non-anonymous or iterated games the human instinct would suggest cooperation instead of defection. In this paper we test this hypothesis in a classical setting of the economic literature, the private provision of a public good (see for instance Davis and Holt, 1993) . According to the theory, a public good can not be produced by the market, since all the potential contributors would choose to free ride (i.e. to defect) rather than to contribute (i.e. to cooperate), this being the Nash equilibrium of the public good game (Selten, 1978) . However, the experimental economic literature provides large evidence against this prediction. The subjects involved in a public good game (PGG hereafter) generally do not play the Nash equilibrium, although they tend to converge to it (Leyard, 1995) , as the deterrence of retaliation weakens as the players approach the last round. Some scholars have introduced the possibility of reducing the payoff of the non-cooperative game partners (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) . These forms of "active" retaliation turn out to be more effective to maintain a high level of cooperation than the simple possibility of responding to a defector by defecting. Ottone (2008) and Lewisch et al. (2011) also find positive evidence for people punishing unfair behaviours. Although this is a consolidated result and in spite of several variations of the original design (see for instance Camerer, 2003) , which confirm that the subjects generally cooperate more than what the theory predicts, so far there is no clear understanding of the subjects' "underground motivations". The traditional design involves a limited number of participants (usually four to ten), which makes plausible that the maintenance of cooperation in a PGG is a matter of reputation formation and signalling (Camerer, 2003 and Gächter, 2004) . Consequently, it is possible that the choice of cooperating under the threat of retaliation is more a reasoned than an instinctive choice.
However, the possibility that things are the other way round cannot be excluded. It is possible that we are cooperative by instinct, and that in a repeated game our tendency to cooperate is displaced by more reasoned choices. Indeed, what may be true is that cooperation may be instinctive in some setting and not in others, possibly according to the ties with the other subjectscultural, familial, or whatever. For instance, Fehr and Gächter (2000) tested successfully the hypothesis that relational goods (namely acquaintance among the experimental subjects) enhance cooperation. Ottone (2008) actually shows that punishment and acquaintance complementarily increase and sustain cooperation in a PGG.
In this paper we will test the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive analysing reaction time in a public good experiment. The data are drawn as by-products from an experiment aiming at studying the role of relational goods in promoting cooperation. We find support for our hypothesis that the nature of cooperation in a PGG is instinctive. We also detect a not irrelevant gender effect.
Experimental design and procedure
A total of 128 undergraduate students of the faculty of economics of the University of Torino, half males and half females, took part in the experiment in 32 sessions, 8 for each of 4 treatments. The groups were made of subjects of the same gender, to avoid possible chivalry (see Eckel and Grossman, 2001) or jealousy effects.
The game. A standard public goods game (PGG) was played by groups of 4 subjects. Each of them was initially endowed with 60 experimental monetary units (EMU) worth 0.01€ each; the participant had to decide which part (from 0 to all) of the initial amount he/she wanted to allocate to a common fund; the sum of all the four contributions was then doubled and equally shared between all the participants, irrespectively of the individual allocations to the fund. Letting E be the initial endowment, S the sum of the contributions, and c i the EMUs allocated by individual i to the fund, in each round i's payoff (P i ) was then P i = E -c i + ½S. The total earnings in a session were given by the sum of the payoffs gained in the ten rounds of the game. The participants received no participation fee.
The treatments. We implemented four different treatments, combining the following two different features: 1a) the subjects were already acquainted before registering to the experiment, in which case they were required to register together as a group for the same session; 1b) they had no previous acquaintance, in which case they registered individually; 2a) before playing the PGG the subjects were requested either to perform a team work or 2b) to engage in a cheap talk. The team work was to perform a budget analysis on the balance sheets of three different companies, by calculating the Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Equity (ROE) ratios, and the cash flow margins for each company. They were also asked to write down a short report and ranking of the companies on the basis of the calculated ratios. This task took them about 45-50 minutes. For the cheap talk treatments the subjects were gathered in a separate room and left to chat together for 20 minutes (the usual duration of a cheap talk found in the literature).
At the beginning of each session the subjects met in front of the lab. In the team work treatment they were asked to sit together in the centre of the lab around a single computer terminal. In the cheap talk treatment they were taken to a different small room (with no computers) and asked to wait while the experimenters set the lab; they were then conducted back after 20 minutes.
After the pre-play task was over, the participants were made to sit at the four computer terminals at the extreme corners of the lab, so to avoid any communication. At the beginning of the game the instructions appeared sequentially on each participant's computer screen and were read aloud by the experimenter at the same pace; the instructions would proceed on to the following page only when all the four participants had clicked on the 'Continue' button on the screen. Before beginning, the participants played a trial round, whose results did not contribute to the final payoff. A paper summary of the instructions was also distributed just before the game started. At the end of each of the ten rounds of the game each subject could see summarized in a table the total amount of the common fund (but not the amount allocated by each subject), her/his earnings for that repetition, the amount of EMU kept and the division of the common fund and the total profit up to that repetition in EMU and euros. At the end of the 10 repetitions the total profit (in EMU and euros) appeared on the screen. The subjects were paid at the end of the experiment, separately, individually and under the usual conditions of anonymity: they were asked to leave the room and come back individually to be paid
The experiment aimed at assessing the effect of relational goods on cooperation; this paper is concerned only with the inference that may be drawn from the response time. We will consider the role of relational goods only with reference to this topic. A detailed analysis of the effect of relational goods on cooperation as observed in the experiment may be found in Lotito, Migheli and Ortona (2011) .
Results
As suggested in section 1, we use the response times as a proxy for how instinctive is the contribution of a player. In particular, we argue that the faster the subject takes the decision about how much to contribute, the more instinctive this decision is. Since both the dependent variables are bounded (the response times between 0 and 120 seconds and the contributions between 0 and 60 experimental monetary units), tobit estimations are computed. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. On average the subjects contributed 33.18 EMUs, taking 17.54 seconds for deciding. In each round the mean payoff was 0.94€, and the participants analysed the results of the round for 86.19 seconds on average.
Contributions and response times are negatively and significantly related (Table 2) , i.e. the higher the contribution, the shorter the time needed by the subject to make the decision. As expected and commonly found, the contributions are decreasing during the game (the "round" variable has a negative and significant coefficient), and the higher the others' contributions in round t-1, the higher the subject's contribution in round t. Two other results are noteworthy: males tend to cooperate less than females, and if the payoff of a subject was high in the previous round, he/she contributes less in the current. This suggests that, while people tend to reciprocate the others' cooperation by cooperating, they also try and defend their "accumulated wealth" by exposing a reduced share of their accrued payoff to risk. In other words: while on the one hand cooperation fosters itself, on the other it is detrimental. In the case of our experiment, the elasticity of cooperation (measured as the one's contribution to the fund) to the others' (0.893) is less than that to one's own payoff (1.197) 2 , indicating that the negative wealth effect overcompensates the positive effect of the others' cooperation. Table 3 shows the results on both the response time and the individual contributions of the previous variables and of the two relational goods. As the sum of the others' contributions increases the response time decreases (first column): subjects respond to cooperation more quickly than to defection, suggesting that cooperating with other co-operators is more instinctive than not cooperating. However, in the first column we see that the individual response time is positively affected by working in team before the experiment: this treatment increases the response time by slightly more than four seconds on average. Taken together, the two results suggest that the experience of team working reinforces cooperation, but also makes it less spontaneous than with strangers. The most obvious interpretation of the second finding is that when the subjects face coworkers they expect more cooperation, but need checking whether they did actually cooperate; while when facing strangers the subjects have no guesses, and act (and cooperate) more instinctively. To sum up, our results suggest that cooperation is the default, "natural" attitude, while the consumption of some types of relational goods (in our case team working) "produces" additional co-operation, that requires more reasoning. Instead, the previous acquaintance has no significant effect.
Males look more instinctive than females. According to experimental evidence, women are more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ), hence it is plausible that they think more before taking a choice that could produce a loss. The suggestion is that risk aversion reduces the instinctive content of a decision. It is interesting to notice that this gender effect is almost as large as that of the team work.
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Remember that gains are in euro, whereas contributions are in EMU, which have a unitary value of 0.01€. Finally, the higher one's gain in the previous round, the more time the subject takes to choose in each round
3
. Although the effect is small in absolute terms (9.5 seconds more for each additional 100 experimental monetary units), this is consistent with the commonsense idea that the role of rational considerations increases with the value of the payoff at stake. This interpretation is confirmed by the figures in the second column of Table 3 . The more a subjects has earned in round t -1, the less s/he is willing to contribute in round t. This effect is particularly strong, as the elasticity of the contribution to the gain in the previous round is larger than 1. Nevertheless one's choice at time t increases with the sum of the others' contributions at t -1. These results suggest that, while income reduces contribution, the others' compliance induces cooperation. As we saw, after controlling for the others' behaviour and for the one's own gain (the two main determinants of the individual contribution), the response time correlates negatively with the one's own contribution, suggesting that the higher it is, the less time the decision maker needs to make the choice. In particular taking one second less to choose corresponds to five EMU more of contribution. This strongly supports the hypothesis that cooperation in a PGG is instinctive, while defection is rational. Table 4 shows the relationship between the response time and the two extreme behaviours: perfect free-riding and perfect cooperation in each round, which are censored by the tobit analysis. The coefficient of the response time his negative in the case of perfect cooperation, and positive when the subject free rides. This is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 1 , and confirms that free-riding is a behaviour more reasoned than cooperation. Albeit this is not the subject of this paper, it is worthy to observe that the consumption of relational goods also confirms its importance in determining individual behaviour: previous acquaintance and/or working together before playing the PGG increases the probability of full cooperation, while decreasing that of free-riding.
As explained in the description of the design, the subjects look at the results (the value of the common fund and their own payoff) at the end of each round. While they are requested to choose how much to contribute within 120 seconds, there is no time constraint on how much time they have to look at the results of the round. Therefore one might argue that those who choose faster, simply think of their strategy while looking at the results, and consequently there may be no difference in the overall decision time of the subjects. While this possibility should be ruled out by the lack of significance of the coefficient of the time to see results variable, Table 5 explicitly addresses the issue; namely the dependent variable of the regression presented in the first column is total time (that becomes a control in column 2), i.e. the sum of the response time and of the time taken by the subject to look at the results of the previous round. From column 2 we can observe that its coefficient is negative and highly significant, which confirms the hypothesis that cooperation is instinctive rather than rational. The coefficients of the other variables basically confirm the previous results.
Conclusions.
Relying on the assumption that the longer is the decision time the less a choice is instinctive, our evidence suggests that in public good provision the instinctive behaviour is cooperation rather than defection. Also, as relational goods enhance cooperation, we argue that the probability for the cooperative instinct to be displaced by more reasoned choice increases as does the consumption of relational goods.
These results allow for a couple of suggestions for more ample inquiries. First, if confirmed they could contribute to explain the emergence of opportunistic behaviours in (relatively) large communities, and, a contrario, why small groups of people may be an effective basis for some programmes of development, such as micro-credit or spontaneous provision of public goods of local interest (Cason and Khan, 1999; Yunus, 2003) . Second, they provide support to an increasing non-economic literature that supports the hypothesis of the instinctive nature of spontaneous cooperation (see Bowles and Gintis, 2011 , for a state-of-the-art discussion). For many years both economics and biology have been accused to support the assumption that human selfishness is "natural". Presently both sciences are increasingly providing evidence that goes against that assumption. For instance, very recently Schmidt and Sommerville (2011) found that their experiments that shows that fairness feelings are already present in 15-month-old infants "support arguments for an evolutionary basis [...] of human egalitarianism, given the rapidly developing nature of other-regarding preferences and their role in the evolution of human-specific forms of cooperation" (from the abstract). Our results seem to point to the same direction. 2011 n.190 
